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Democracy by Competition:
Referenda and Federalism
in Switzerland
Bruno S. Frey and Iris Bohnet
Institute for Empirical Economic Research
University of Zurich
Competition is not only a prerequisite for the successful working of economics but also of political
coordination systems. We argue that popular referenda and federalism are the key factors in
maintaining competition in the political arena. Competitive economic or political markets require free
entry and exit and the absence of regulations that prevent suppliers from being successful with the best
product-be it goods or services in the form of policies-and prevent citizens from choosing freely.
The democratic process1 is based on the same criterion as the market process,
namely, that only the individual person's preferences are to count. It is not a
benevolent dictator, nor an expert, nor a politician who should decide what is good
or bad, but the citizens themselves. Thus, assuming that citizens are the principals
and politicians are their agents, the extent to which shirking occurs and, in
particular, how far legislators pursue their own goals instead of following their
electors' preferences, is an important question. Also assuming that the economists'
normative base-methodological individualism-remains valid when leaving the
marketplace and entering the political sphere, then competition must be the answer
to the question of how people's wishes can best and most effectively be represented
and coordinated in the public sphere.
However, neither for the economy nor the polity does it make sense to analyze
an unreachable ideal,2 namely, a fully competitive market without any externalities,
information asymmetries, or monopolies. What counts is the relative efficiency of
a decisionmaking system-in this case, of a direct democracy compared to a
representative system and of federal decisionmaking compared to centralism.
Even though this article builds on the "Swiss experience" with referenda and
'Democracy is not concerned with end states but is a process by which rules are developed and
decisions are taken: Norman P. Barry, "The Invisible Hand in Economics and Politics," Hobart Paper,
no. I l l (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1988).
Harold Demsetz, Efficiency, Competition and Policy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989).
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federalism, it suggests that the observations made for Switzerland are of great
importance for all democracies.3 Referenda as a means of breaking the cartel of the
classe politique (political class) are discussed in the first section. The arguments
against referenda put forward by many political scientists are taken into account.
The section following provides an overview of the implications of federalism for
policymaking in Switzerland and stresses the close link between the two institu-
tions. Without different subunits competing, referenda tend to degenerate into
simple plebiscites, which are initiated by the politicians in power only if they are
advantageous to them.
REFERENDA
Popular referenda have proven to be very successful in Switzerland for fighting
restraints on competition in the political market. We will elaborate on two possible
market failures: monopolies (or cartels) and information problems. Externalities
are not discussed here because they do not depend on the directness of a democracy,
but will be examined in the next section.
Referenda Against Politicians' Cartels
Building on rent-seeking theory, it is argued that representatives have a common
interest in forming a cartel to protect and possibly extend political rents.4 Referenda
and initiatives are means to break the politicians' coalition against the voters.
Initiatives require a certain number of signatures and force a referendum on a given
issue. They are a particularly important institution because they take the agenda-
setting monopoly away from the politicians and enable outsiders to propose issues
for democratic decision, including those that many elected officials might have
preferred to exclude from the agenda. As has been shown in public choice theory,5
the group determining which propositions are voted on and in what order has a
considerable advantage, because it decides to a large extent which issues will be
discussed when, and which ones will be left out.
Referenda, obligatory or optional, enable the voters to state their preferences to
the politicians more effectively than in a representative democracy. In a represen-
tative system, deviating preferences can only be expressed by informal protests,
which are difficult to organize and make politically relevant. If no immediate action
is taken, voters have to wait until election time, when they will still find it difficult
to express specific demands on substantive issues. In a direct democracy, however,
citizens may regularly participate in political decisions. In Switzerland, for
example, over the past 150 years, there were 147 obligatory referenda (on consti-
tutional issues) and 103 optional referenda (on laws); over the past 100 years (the
3See also Andre Eschet-Schwarz, "The Role of Semi-Direct Democracy in Shaping Swiss Federalism,"
Publius: The Journal of Federalism 19 (Winter 1989): 79-106.
*The literature on rent-seeking was developed by Gordon Tullock, "The Welfare Costs of Tariff,
Monopolies and Theft," Western Economic Journal 5 (June 1967): 224-232; James M. Buchanan,
Robert D. Tollison, and Gordon Tullock, eds., Towards a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society (College
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1980); and surveyed by Robert D. Tollison, "Rent-Seeking: A
Survey," Kyklos 35 (1982): 575-602.
'Arthur T. Denzau, "Constitutional Change and Agenda Control," Public Choice, Carnegie Papers
on Political Economy 47 (1985): 183-217.
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initiative was instituted in 1891), there were 104 initiatives. These figures refer to
the federal arena only6; in the cantonal and communal arenas, there have been
thousands more.
A recent referendum made it clear that the political elite's interests do not always
correspond with voters' preferences. In September 1992, the citizens of Switzer-
land turned down two proposals seeking to increase substantially the salaries and
the staff of Swiss members of Parliament. Both issues would have become law
without Swiss voters taking the optional referendum, and both issues would clearly
have been to the benefit of the elected officials.
It seems obvious that while politicians may try to secure benefits for themselves,
taxpayers are not always ready to pay for such expenses. Privileges, however, do
not always appear in the form of direct income for the representatives, but may also
result in higher status or prestige.7 Many more telling pieces from democratic
history in Switzerland could be adduced here.8 Interesting examples are two
referenda on Switzerland joining international organizations or agreements: the
United Nations in 1986 and the European Economic Area in 1992.
Both proposals were rejected by the citizens, even though the political elite
strongly supported them. These referenda were universally supported by all major
political parties; all pressure groups, including both employers and trade unions; a
huge majority of the members of Parliament; and the executive branch. However,
the popular referendum on Switzerland joining the United Nations resulted in a
rejection by 76 percent of the voters; on 6 December 1992, 50.3 percent of the
population and a majority of the cantons (sixteen out of twenty-three) voted against
Switzerland becoming part of the European Economic Area. This clear rejection
by the federal units induced a broad public discussion of the merits of the federal
system in Switzerland where not only the majority of the population but also of the
cantons is required to adopt a proposal.
These two examples of the citizens voting differently than the public officials in
power are not exceptions: In 39 percent of the 250 referenda held in Switzerland
between 1948 and 1990, the will of the majority of the voters differed from the
opinion of the Parliament. Thus, in a representative system, the decision by the
Parliament would have deviated from the people's preferences in 39 percent of all
cases where referenda were held.
Econometric cross-section studies for Switzerland,9 moreover, reveal that politi-
'Bundesamt fur Statistik (Federal Office for Statistics), ed., Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz
(Statistical Yearbook on Switzerland) (Zurich: NZZ-Verlag, 1992), p. 354.
'Empirical evidence for the extent of rent appropriations by the German politicians is provided by
Hans H. von Araim, Die Panel, der Abgeordnete und das Geld (The Party, the Representative, and
Money) (Mainz, Germany: v. Hase & Koehler, 1991).
*For more examples see Charles B. Blankart, "A Public Choice View of Swiss Liberty," pp. 83-95.
'Werner W. Pommerehne, "Institutional Approaches to Public Expenditure: Empirical Evidence
from Swiss Municipalities," Journal of Public Economics 9 (April 1978): 255-280; Werner W.
Pommerehne, "The Empirical Relevance of Comparative Institutional Analysis," European Economic
Review 34 (May 1990): 458-469; Gebhard Kirchgassner and Werner W. Pommerehne, "Evolution of
Public Finance as a Function of Federal Structure: A Comparison Between Switzerland and the Federal
Republic of Germany" (Paper presented at the 46th congress of the International Institute of Public
Finance [IIPF], Brussels, Belgium, 1990); and Bernard Steunenberg, "Referendum, Initiative, and Veto
Power: Budgetary Decision Making in Local Government," Kyklos 45 (1992): 501-529.
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cal decisions with respect to publicly supplied goods correspond better with the
voters' preferences when the institutions of direct political participation are more
extensively developed. Because it is the individual taxpayers and not the elected
officials per se who have to bear the costs of government activities, it is not
surprising that public expenditures are ceteris paribus lower in communities where
the taxpayers themselves can decide on such matters.
Taxpayers, however, do reward politicians' performance by a high tax morale if
they are satisfied with policies in their community. This can be shown for Swiss
cantons, which have differing institutional options for citizens' political participa-
tion.10 In some cantons, referenda and initiatives can be taken on virtually all issues,
whereas others grant these options only on special issues and under special
conditions orrely completely on the institutions of representative democracy. It has
been econometrically shown that the more direct democratic institutions are, the
less tax cheating takes place. Compared to the mean of all cantons, almost 8 percent
(that is, about Sfr. 1.600 per taxpayer per year) less income was concealed in cantons
with a high degree of direct political influence. In contrast, in cantons with a low
degree of direct participation possibilities and, therefore, low tax morale, the mean
income undeclared exceeded the mean for all cantons by roughly Sfr. 1.500.
Rexford Santerre used the price of land as an indicator for individuals' demand
to live in a certain community." His findings support the hypothesis that the more
developed the direct participation options in a jurisdiction, the more people are
attracted to it (i.e., the higher the willingness to pay and thus the price of land).
Referenda do, however, not only serve to break up the politicians' coalitions by
destroying their monopoly on agenda-setting, but they also induce more competi-
tion in yet another respect: They provide information and stimulate communica-
tion.
Referenda Against Information Asymmetries
In economic research on politics, the process which takes place before casting the
vote has been almost completely neglected.12 Economics is the science of choice,
a choice between known alternatives. These alternatives, however, have been
shaped and defined by a process of verbal exchange.13 This discourse among the
citizens puts new issues on individuals' agendas, raises their perception, and
communicates the arguments in the media. It offers information free of
charge—information that is not only relevant to the issue in question but also to an
evaluation of the performance of politicians, parties, and interest groups.
In order to be able to judge the relevance of the outcome of a referendum for one's
'"Werner W. Pommerehne and Bruno S. Frey, "The Effects of Tax Administration on Tax Morale"
(Paper presented at the Conference on Tax Administration and Tax Evasion of the International Seminar
in Public Economics [ISPE] at El Escorial, Spain, June 1992).
"Rexford E. Santerre, "Representative Versus Direct Democracy: A Tiebout Test of Relative
Performance," Public Choice 48 (1986): 55-63.
12See, e.g., the survey by Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice II (Cambridge, England: Cambridge
University Press, 1989).
"For the relevance of communication in democracies, see John S. Dryzek, Discursive Democracy:
Politics, Policy, and Political Science (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
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own life as well as to evaluate decisionmakers' behavior, citizens need to know the
working properties of alternative rules. As Victor Vanberg and James Buchanan
put it: Individuals must have "constitutional theories."14 "A person's constitutional
theories are about matters of fact. They are his predictions (embodying assump-
tions and beliefs) about what the factual outcomes of alternative rules will be."15
Besides information, communication may also enhance people's willingness to
accept the decisions made by a referendum. They feel more responsible for
whatever the result of the referendum may be because the process and the rules
made them part of the decision. In a representative system, however, it is not
difficult to shift the responsibility onto the actual decisionmakers, the politicians.
As was pointed out for the European Community (EC), the more removed the
agents are from the principals, the easier it is to pass the buck to someone else.16
Thus, the very indirect system of the EC makes it easy for national politicians to
blame the commission for any decision that may endanger their reelection. (This
commission created in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome, whose primary task is to initiate
policies and implement those already agreed upon, is the supranational and bonding
element composed of nine members appointed for renewable four-year terms by the
national governments.) This means, however, that the EC can make even more
decisions that do not represent the will of the people than is the case within the
national arena.
Friedrich Hayek called the market a discovering mechanism.17 The same could
be said about discourse. By talking to one another, people discover the means of
fulfilling their preferences. By relating to other people's positions, they find out
where they stand. In economic terms, it could be said that communication changes
the production function to fulfill individuals' preferences.18
The Swiss experience shows that people's demand for discussion varies,
depending on the importance of the issue in question. Some referenda motivate
intensive and far-reaching discussions that lead to a high rate of voter participation
(e.g., the proposal to join the European Economic Area witnessed a participation
rate of 79 percent, though the average turnout between 1985 and 1992 was only 42
percent). Referenda considered to be of little importance by the voters engender
little discussion and low participation (as low as 25 percent). This variability in the
intensity of discussion and participation overrides the much studied "paradox of
voting."19
"Viktor Vanberg and James M. Buchanan, "Interests and Theories in Constitutional Choice,"
Journal of Theoretical Politics 1 (January 1989): 49-62.
15Ibid., 52.
"Roland Vaubel, "A Public Choice Approach to International Organization," Public Choice 51
(1986): 39-57.
"Friedrich A. Hayek, "Competition as Discovery Procedure," New Studies in Philosophy, Politics.
Economics and the History of Ideas, ed. Friedrich A. Hayek (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978).
"George J. Stigler and Gary S. Becker, "De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum" (Matters of Taste Are
Not Debatable), The American Economic Review 67 (March 1977): 76-90.
"Gordon Tullock, Towards a Mathematics of Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
1967) and William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting," American
Political Science Review 62 (March 1968): 25-42.
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Even though a political decision is formally taken by a referendum, the issue in
question does not disappear from public discourse after citizens ha ve cast their vote.
The referendum clearly reveals how the citizens feel and who and how large the
minorities are. Groups dissenting from the majority are identified; their preferences
become visible and part of the political process. A post-referendum adjustment
process to please the losers is often observed.
Switzerland again provides a suitable example. In 1989, a popular initiative
demanded that the Swiss army be completely dismantled. To many Swiss, this was
considered an attack against one of the most essential, almost sacred institutions of
the country. The classe politique was again solidly against the proposal, and the
generals threatened to retire if the initiative was not overwhelmingly rejected.
(They expected a share of no-votes close to 90 percent.)
The referendum outcome was surprising to almost everyone. One-third of the
voters (and a majority among the young voters eligible for service) voted for the
dissolution of the army. After a short period of shock, several parties suggested
changes in the army to make this institution more acceptable among the population.
These changes, which were considered impossible to achieve before the referen-
dum, were put into effect within a short time. A major innovation-the introduction
of a substitute to regular service in the army, which, by then, had been mandatory
for all Swiss men-had been rejected in several referenda before, the last time in 1984
with a rejection rate of 64 percent. This change of individuals' preferences seems
to have been induced by the discourse that accompanied the previously hotly
discussed referendum on the dissolution of the army.
Criticism of Referenda
Democracy is not concerned with end states; solutions are not simply adopted,
but developed. In the course of the direct democratic process, information is
produced and preferences are shaped-in the sense that the voters are confronted
with political issues they have not considered before, and which they learn to
evaluate according to their basic values. Skeptics, however, worry about the
intellectual capability of the citizens to cast votes on complicated, technical issues.20
This task, they argue, should be left to an elite.21
Following the individualistic view and taking individuals' preferences as the
normative base for evaluation, such a charge is unacceptable. Compatibility with
the citizens' preferences is valued higher than any possible technocratic brilliance.
The voters, moreover, need not have detailed knowledge on the issues, but rather
on the main questions at stake. These, however, are not of a technical nature but
involve basic decisions (i.e., value judgments), which a voter is as qualified to make
as a politician. It has even been argued that politicians are a group particularly ill-
20Direct and representative democracies are compared by Thomas E. Cronin, Direct Democracy: The
Politics of Initiative, Referendum and Recall (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989); and
David B. Magleby, Direct Legislation: Voting on Ballot Propositions in the United States (Baltimore,
Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984).
21For criticism of the Swiss system see Hans Peter Hertig, "Volksabstimmungen" (Referenda),
Handbuch des politischen Systems der Schweiz (Handbook of Political Systems in Switzerland), ed.
Ulrich Kloti (Bern, Switzerland: Haupt, 1984), 2:247-277.
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equipped to make such decisions because, as professionals, they spent most of their
life in sessions and commissions, and meetings and cocktail parties, and therefore
know much less about reality than ordinary people.22
This argument only holds, of course, if voters are given the opportunity to make
their choices seriously. As has been pointed out for California, this is not always
the case: "Last November any Los Angelano voter was allotted ten minutes in the
ballot booth to make over forty different electoral choices, varying from statewide
propositions to local judgeships; in 1990 the total was over 100."23
Such obviously ineffective institutions, however, not only keep a direct democ-
racy from functioning effectively but also prevent voters from making serious
"electoral choices" and, thus, might even lead to worse outcomes in a representative
democracy. It is, furthermore, not clear why the citizens are trusted to be able to
choose between parties and politicians in elections but not between issues in
referenda. If anything, the former choice seems to be more difficult because
electors must form expectations about politicians' actions in the future.
It is not argued here that there is no room for a political elite, for a parliament,
and a bureaucracy in a democracy. They are indispensable to provide information,
work out the details, and assess the consequences of the various political issues at
hand. This technical expertise of the representatives must be weighed against the
human competence of the citizens-a process which seems to have led to a recent
trend in Europe: Important political issues are referred to the population even in
representative democracies. This can be witnessed by the popular referenda on
entry into the European Community held in the Scandinavian countries and the
United Kingdom, or on the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark, France, and Ireland.
Critics also point out that well organized interest groups might utilize direct
democratic procedures for their own benefits. It cannot be denied that financially
potent parties and pressure groups are better able to start initiatives and to engage
in referendum propaganda than poor and nonorganized interests. Again, there is no
sense in having the impossible aspiration creating a totally egalitarian democracy
where every citizen is a citizen-legislator.24 Of course, there remain disparities in
individuals' and groups' capacities to influence the direction of government. It is
always true that rich and well organized groups wield more power.
The important question, however, is not if there are any disparities, but under
which institutional arrangements or rules, organizational and financial advantages
play a more important role. We argue that lobbying is more successful, the less
democratic a system is, because even with no elections, as in dictatorships, interest
groups do have channels of influence.25 For the European Community, it is argued
22Hans Magnus Enzensberger, "Erbarmen mit den Politikem" (To Have Mercy with Politicians),
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Frankfurt General Newspaper), 9 November 1992, p. 18.
""Government in California: Buckling Under the Strain," The Economist, 13February 1993, pp. 19-
22.
"The argument for a unitary democracy is presented in Jane J. Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary
Democracy (New York: Basic Books, 1980).
"Bruno S. Frey and Reiner Eichenberger, "The Political Economy of Stabilization Programmes in
Developing Countries," Technical Papers, vol. 59 (Paris: OECD Development Centre, 1992).
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that pressure groups are able to exert more power than in the former nation-states
exactly because the EC is less democratic than its member states.26 On the other
hand, the experience of Switzerland shows that even if pressure groups and the
political class are united, they cannot always have their way, particularly on
important issues.
FEDERALISM
Federalism is the other important institution that serves to establish competition
within the political arena.27 Federal competition provides for the third possible
market failure in politics-political externalities. These are costs that develop for the
general population if certain groups are able to appropriate the benefits of a publicly
supplied good but do not have to pay the price for it. These groups may be the
politicians and the bureaucrats who are seen as self-interested rent-seekers28 or
special interest groups that try to "capture"29 the relevant decisionmakers. Although
it is not argued here that politicians and bureaucrats always and exclusively seek to
maximize their own utility to the extent of actively exploiting the citizens and
taxpayers, taking governments to be completely responsive to the population's
wishes is not realistic either. Thus, federal competition serves as a safeguard against
decisionmakers taking unfair advantage of their discretionary power.
Even though political externalities are stressed here, the authors are well aware
that federal competition may lead to an increase in economic spillovers. Many
economists, therefore, argue that centralized regulation must be introduced to
correct market failures arising from economic externalities.30 A vivid discussion
about centralizing and harmonizing is going on in the European Community at the
moment. With the creation of a single market and, therewith, the abolishment of
barriers to trade, taxes may need to be harmonized and redistribution to be deferred
to the Community.31
"Iris Bohnet, "Interessenvertretung in der EG: Die Landwirtschaft" (Interest Representation in the
Economic Community: Agriculture) (Zurich: University of Zurich, 1991, Mimeo.); Svein S.Andersen
and Kjell A. Eliassen, "European Community Lobbying," European Journal of Political Research 20
(September 1991): 173-187; and William S. Peirce, "After 1992: The European Community and the
Redistribution of Rents," Kyklos 44 (1991): 521-536.
"See also Daphne A. Kenyon and John Kincaid, eds., Competition among States and Local
Governments: Efficiency and Equity inAmerican Federalism (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press,
1991) and U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, lnterjurisdictional Competition:
Good or Bad for the Federal System? (Washington, D.C.: ACIR, 1991).
"See Buchanan, Tollison, and Tullock, Rent Seeking.
BSee George J. Stigler, "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics and
Management Science 2 (Spring 1971): 3-21; and the survey on the economic theory of regulation in Sam
Peltzman, "The Growth of Government," The Journal of Law & Economics!"*, (October 1980): 209-287.
This cooperation of the public sector with parts of the private sector is called "the power of distributional
coalitions" by Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
Press, 1982).
"For the public-interest view of governments see Richard A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public
Finance (New York: McGraw Hill, 1959).
"Dominique Bureau and Paul Champsaur, "Fiscal Federalism and European Economic Unification,"
The American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 82 (May 1992): 88-92; Damien J. Neven,
"Regulatory Reform in the European Community," The American Economic Review, Papers and
Proceedings 82 (May 1992): 98-103; and Friedrich Schneider, "The Federal and Fiscal Structures of
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An extensive analysis of the debate about the efficient degree of harmonization
and centralization cannot be provided here; however, we stress that property rights
theory32 and constitutional economics33 suggest that neither public goods nor
income redistribution are sufficient reasons to justify harmonization and centraliza-
tion as long as adequate property rights cannot be assigned and guaranteed.
Surprisingly enough, many European countries do not know the institution of
federal competition at all; the most prominent examples are France, Great Britain,
and Sweden. Others, such as Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, have introduced
competition between autonomous local governments to a limited extent. However,
the potential offered by federalism34 to establish a vigorous competition between
government units has so far not been rationally designed by any country. The
principle of "fiscal equivalence"35 seems to apply only to some extent (e.g., in the
United States, Australia, and Switzerland).36
Fiscal equivalence means that the size of a political decisionmaking unit should
depend on the spatial effects of the benefits and costs of a publicly supplied good.
Each public function (e.g., education, police, fire protection, or, if not privately
supplied, refuse collection) could be allocated to a particular political unit whose
geographic extension varies according to the particular supply conditions. The
Swiss Canton of Thurgau, for instance, uses this concept; hence, several hundreds
of such multiple functional and overlapping jurisdictions exist, each with corre-
sponding taxes.37
This decentralization of decisionmaking enables the citizens to "vote with their
feet."38 If they are dissatisfied with the publicly supplied good and the correspond-
ing cost, they can leave the jurisdiction searching for a different jurisdiction where
their preferences are better fulfilled. This possibility of "exit"39 tends to undermine
regional or functional cartels by politicians.
Representative and Direct Democracies as Models for a European Federal Union? Some Thoughts on
the Public Choice Approach" (Linz, Austria: University of Linz, 1992, Mimeo.).
32For a recent survey see Yoram Barzel, Economic Analysis of Property Rights (Cambridge, England:
Cambridge University Press, 1989).
"Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan, The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political
Economy (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
"Charles M. Tiebout, "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure," Journal of Political Economy 64
(October 1956): 416-424 and Wallace E. Oates, Studies in Fiscal Federalism (Aldershot, England:
Edward Elgar, 1992).
"Mancur Olson, Jr., "The Principle of 'Fiscal Equivalence': The Division of Responsibilities
Among Different Levels of Government," The American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings
59 (May 1969): 479-487 and Mancur Olson, 'Toward a More General Theory of Governmental
Structure," The American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 76 (May 1986): 120-125.
"For the Swiss experience with federalism, see Hansjorg Blochliger and Rene L. Frey, "Der
Schweizerische Fdderalismus: Ein Modell fur den Institutionellen Aufbau der Europaischen Union?"
(Swiss Federalism: A Model for Institutional Development in the European Union?), Aussenwirtschaft
(Foreign Trade) 47 (1992): 515-548.
37Alessandra Casella and Bruno Frey, "Federalism and Clubs: Towards an Economic Theory of
Overlapping Political Jurisdictions," The European Economic Review 36 (April 1992): 639-646.
38Tiebout, "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure"; James M. Buchanan, "An Economic Theory of
Clubs," Economica 32 (February 1965): 1-14; and Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).
"Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty.
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Federalism, however, is not only an alternative to referenda but also a prerequi-
site for the effective working of a direct democracy. In small communities, the
information costs of voters when deciding on issues or judging representatives'
performance are much lower than in a large jurisdiction. The more fiscal equiva-
lence is guaranteed, the better the benefits of publicly supplied goods can be
acknowledged and the corresponding costs be attributed to the relevant political
programs or actors. Thus, while federalism provides for cheaper information,
referenda enable citizens to use this knowledge effectively in the political process.
The interdependence of federalism and referenda also works the other way
around: Referenda improve the working of federalism. Besides the possibility of
voting with their feet, citizens may also vote directly. This represents a double
incentive for politicians to take their citizens' preferences into account; otherwise,
they may lose their tax base to another jurisdiction or may be forced by referenda
and initiatives to meet the demands of the voters.
CONCLUSION
Direct democracy and federalism are effective mechanisms to provide competition
in the political arena. At the same time, they produce incentives for politicians to
take the citizens' preferences into account. We do not argue, however, that
referenda and federalism are the only institutions to prevent politicians from
pursuing their own goals at taxpayers' expense. All democracies have recognized
the potential danger lying in cartels among politicians and have therefore created
institutions to prevent their appearance. Many constitutions know the division of
executive, legislative, and judicial powers; the establishment of two houses of
parliament; and electoral competition between parties.
Further constitutional devices are rules prohibiting the excessive appropriation
of rents by politicians, the most stringent ones being against corruption. Courts of
accounts are supposed to control politicians' and administrators' behavior. It can
be shown, however, that at least in some respects, these institutions tend to widen
the gap between what the decisionmakers provide and what the population wishes.40
Instead of relying on direct democratic institutions, individuals may also express
their dissatisfaction by other types of "voice."41 Governments can be forced to
respond to citizens' wishes by various forms of protest, ranging from complaints by
individuals to violent uprisings by the masses. If taxpayers do not have any ability
to exit to another jurisdiction (as in the former communist countries), or if this kind
of exit is relatively more expensive, they may prefer an internal exit to the shadow
economy. In both cases, the rulers lose part of their power because the tax base and
the area in which their regulations are followed shrink accordingly.
'This argument is developed by Bruno S. Frey and Angel Serna, "Eine Politisch-Okonomische
Betrachtung des Rechnungshofes" (A Political-Economic View of the Public Accounting Office),
Finanzarchiv (Financial Archive) 48 (1990): 244-270 and applied to the Italian Corte dei Conti by Bruno
S. Frey, Angel Serna, and Ilda Ferro, "La Corte dei Conti: l'Aspetto Politico-Economico" (The Court
of the Counts: The Political-Economic Aspect) (Zurich, Switzerland: University of Zurich, 1993,
Mimeo.).
"Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty.
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The "Swiss experience," nevertheless, suggests that all these institutions do not
provide a sufficient safeguard against politicians' rent-seeking because they do not
effectively fight political market failures. Initiatives and referenda, however, break
the politicians' coalition by destroying their monopoly on agenda-setting and
decisionmaking. Furthermore, they induce a discussion on relevant issues and thus
provide information for all citizens at a very low cost. The informational advantage
of the classe politique shrinks.
By providing the exit option, federal competition undermines political externali-
ties in the form of politicians' or pressure groups' rent-seeking. Fiscal federalism
enables the citizens to judge the politicians' performance and compare it with
differing jurisdictions. The federal subunits of Switzerland, the cantons, represent
a good example of the interdependent working of federalism and direct democracy.
Even though this article refers to the "Swiss case," we suggest that the results are
of general relevance. Referenda and federalism provide better means of fulfilling
individual preferences than any other constitutional device designed for breaking
up politicians' cartels.

